

**Humanism and *Disegno*:  
Neoplatonism at the Accademia di San Luca in Rome**

**John Hendrix, Rhode Island School of Design**  
[jhendrix@risd.edu](mailto:jhendrix@risd.edu)

**John Hendrix earned a PhD in Architecture at Cornell University. He currently teaches classes at the Rhode Island School of Design, the University of Connecticut, and Roger Williams University. He is the author of six books: *Architecture and Psychoanalysis*, *Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Spirit*, *Platonic Architectonics*, *Architectural Forms and Philosophical Structures*, *The Relation Between Architectural Forms and Philosophical Structures in the Work of Francesco Borromini in Seventeenth-Century Rome*, and *History and Culture in Italy*.**

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I would like to explore the role that Neoplatonism played in the development of the concept of *disegno* at the Accademia di San Luca in Rome, and its influence on subsequent architecture, for the purpose of illustrating the importance of Renaissance Humanism in the culture of Baroque Rome.

In his treatise, *L'Idée de' pittori, scultori ed architetti*, in 1607, Federico Zuccari, the director of the Academy, described *disegno interno* as a Platonic Idea in the mind of the artist, and a *forma spirituale* which mediates between *archê* and *eidos*, between universal and particular. *Disegno interno* is a *scintilla della divinità*, a spark of the fire of the Divine intellect, which is manifest in *Nous*, or Intellectual Principle, from Plotinus, that part of Mind which participates in the Divine. Form enters matter through design, and intellect is the instrument which molds form. For Zuccari, *disegno* is a *segno di dio in noi*, or sign of God in us, as manifest in *intellectus speculativus*, or internal contemplation. Universal design becomes particular design as universals are transformed into particulars, through types, similitudes and metaphors. The spark in *Nous* creates dream images, phantasms, and imaginations.

Plato, in the *Republic*, distinguished between imitative representation and cognitive process. The artist invests form with concept. Aristotle, in the *Metaphysics*, described the form of the work of art as pre-existing in the mind of the artist. Plotinus, in the *Enneads*, defined form as that which enters matter through intellect. The artist reproduces the principles of nature rather than its appearance. Form or *eidos*, in both art and nature, is produced by the ordering principles of Mind, or *Nous*. Marsilio Ficino, in *Sopra lo amore*, or *Commentary on the Symposium of Plato*, in 1444, distinguished between *Bellezza*, sensible beauty, and the *Bello*, *disegno interno*, of which *Bellezza* is a product. *Res extensa*, external form, is a realization of *res cogitans*, ideas. In Ficino's *Theologia Platonica*, design is seen as a mirror to the intellect, reasoned through 'metaphor and similitude'. This concept is developed in the transcripts of the Accademia di San Luca in Rome, *Origine et Progresso dell'Accademia del Disegno*, in 1604, written by Romano Alberti. The distinction between *Bello* and *Bellezza* is developed by Pietro da Cortona in his treatise, *Trattato della Pittura e Scultura*, in 1652, written with Domenico Ottonelli, using the pseudonyms Britio Prenetteri and Odomenigico Lelonotti.

Pietro da Cortona played an active role in the Academy, as did Carlo Maderno, and the influence of the concept of *disegno* can be seen in particular in the architecture of Pietro and Francesco Borromini, in works such as Santi Luca e Martina and San Carlo alle Quattro Fontane, which can be seen as visual and structural representations of the intellect of the artist and the principles of nature. This can be seen in mathematical, geometrical, and metaphorical models of the structure of the cosmos as used by both architects. Precedents for the role of 'metaphor and similitude' in architectural design can be seen in works such as Michelangelo's Porta Pia and Giulio Romano's Palazzo del Tè in the sixteenth century.

## The Idea

Zuccari expressed in *L'Idea de' pittori, scultori ed architetti*, in the Neoplatonic tradition, that the form of the work of art exists first in the mind of the artist, considering design universally as the fabrication of every intellectual idea<sup>1</sup>. *Disegno interno* is 'a concept formed in our mind, that enables us explicitly and clearly to recognize anything, whatever it may be, and to operate practically in conformance with the thing intended'<sup>2</sup>. The Idea is a *forma spirituale* which is both 'divided and used by the intellect to apprehend all natural things clearly and distinctly'<sup>3</sup>, and the expression of such apprehension in artistic materials; here the Idea is differentiated from the theological Idea as it is applied to artistic production, or artistic representation, which is called *disegno esterno*, or external design. Following Plato, *disegno esterno* is the imitation of an idol, and it is also a metaphor for *disegno interno*, the inner ordering principle and Neoplatonic light of the intellect<sup>4</sup>.

Plato conceived of the idea as being 'in the world of shapes and figures something perfect and sublime, to which imagined form those objects not accessible to sensory perception can be related by way of imitation'<sup>5</sup>, in the words of Cicero in the *Orator*. For Plato the Idea, the form of a thing, exists 'eternally, being contained in our reason and our intellect: all else is born and dies, remains in a state of flux'. As such Plato distinguished between imitative representation<sup>6</sup>, or the ability to render only the sensory appearances of the material world, and form which is invested with the concept of cognitive truth in the attainment of a universal and eternal form corresponding to the idea. Such a distinction would mean a distinction and separation, and also identification, between the aesthetic and the theoretical, between sensory experience and rational cognition.

Form and concept, image and idea should be combined in the work of art. The work of art is defined as being invested with scientific and mathematical principles which it can reveal, as in architecture and music, but can only exist in the realm of images, and not ideas, and can thus inhibit as much as aid the knowledge of the Idea—the unrepresentable should not be represented, though form should suggest concept. As the reception of material objects by sensory perception is conceived as a cognitive function, so form should be invested with cognitive process, but can only be done so by that process. Aristotle distinguishes between form and matter, appearance and idea as well, but he sees them as interacting, in that form enters into matter. In Book VII of *Metaphysics*, 'The thing in the sense of form or substance we do not make, but the so-called compound whole we make; and in everything that is made matter is present and one part of it is matter and the other form'<sup>7</sup>.

Art for Aristotle is a form of the power of thought, and the form of the material product contains the essence, or is the essence, of the form in the idea of the maker. As form and matter interact, so thought and substance interact in form. The form of a work of art exists in the mind of the artist before being translated into matter, and, as for Plato, pure form is indivisible in contrast to its material existence as part of matter, which is divisible and temporal. In the *Metaphysics*, 'That which is a union of form and matter can dissolve into material parts; but that which is not bound up with matter, cannot dissolve'<sup>8</sup>. Matter is that which springs from the Prime Unity. It is the single substance to which all bodies can be reduced.

For Aristotle, the Idea is the combination of matter and form. Cognition, as a universal act, an act of the Universal Intelligence of which human intelligence is a part, is trans-

formed into the form of the material object or work of art. The work of art is invested with the Universal Intelligence, unified in the absolute, but dissolved into material parts through individual cognitive acts, then combined in the compound whole. The cognitive acts, the thoughts, are then identified with the material parts. From the *Metaphysics*, ‘The mind thinks of itself, when it takes on the nature of an object of thought. It becomes an object of thought through its perceiving and thinking, and then thought and object of thought are the same’<sup>9</sup>. Matter is integrated with form, and thought is conflated with the object of thought in its actualizing potential as a product of the diversification of the absolute, through the realization of form, as in art. Such a concept would lead to the development of *disegno* and the Idea in sixteenth-century Italy, where art is seen as the manifestation of conceptualization itself through the Idea, which can be read in seventeenth-century Roman Baroque architecture. As Zuccari explains, in *L’Idea de’ Pittori, Scultori e Architetti*, ‘Design is formed form, and imaged in the soul, and in the intellect; therefore our soul and intellect should be as instruments; the senses bring objects, and sensible forms from the intellective part of the soul, and the intellect takes the forms from the forms, that is Design is formed from the same types, and so learns, intends, and knows...’<sup>10</sup>.

For Aristotle, the interaction between form and matter and between appearance and idea is paralleled by the interaction between the general concept (relating to Universal Intelligence) and the particular idea, relating to the cognitive act. From the *Metaphysics*, the individual man, for example, is ‘this particular form in this particular flesh and blood’<sup>11</sup>. The appearance in art does not imitate the Idea—instead form enters into matter. In that the forms of art can exist in the mind of the artist beforehand, they are different from the forms of nature, but they are like the forms of nature in the interaction of form and matter. In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle illustrates the preexistence of form in the mind with the conception of the house by the architect and the statue by the sculptor, though the house and statue can only preexist as form through the Idea, and not as matter.

### **The Neoplatonic Idea: Plotinus, Aquinas and Ficino**

Plotinus, who taught philosophy in Rome from 245 to 270, separated form from matter as well. He explains, in ‘On the Intellectual Beauty’, the Eighth Tractate of *The Six Enneads*, ‘The form is not in the material; it is in the designer before ever it enters the stone; and the artificer holds it not by his equipment of eyes and hands but by his participation in his art’<sup>12</sup>, that is, in the Idea, the conceptualization of the form. As for Plato, form is transferred from the Universal Intellect into matter, but in a contaminated state, disseminated and no longer ideal. Beauty in art is only a derivation of beauty in the Idea or Intellect.

The form in the material cannot be compared to the form in the Idea. Art, in the conceptualization of the Universal Intellect through which the form is given, must contain within it an idea of absolute form in the material, an internal idea which must be communicated although its material existence, its external form, falls short. Plotinus explains in *The Enneads*, that the Idea or Reason Principle must contain a higher degree of beauty and purity than anything produced as art, as an external object. The order of the universe may be revealed through particular form, as the macrocosm is revealed through the microcosm, through the Idea, through conceptualization in form. For Plotinus, this occurs through the intellect or principle which is found in nature. ‘Artists do not simply repro-

duce the visible, but they go back to the principles in which nature itself had found its origin'<sup>13</sup>. The generation of the principles of the origin of nature constitute the Idea. The architecture of Borromini, as at San Carlo alle Quattro Fontane, can be seen as a visual and structural representation of the principles of nature as given by Neoplatonic philosophy. The architecture of Leon Battista Alberti, as at Santa Maria Novella, seeks as well to reproduce the principles of nature in mathematical and geometric abstractions.

Then the task for Plotinus is to discover what in the principles of nature can be transferred as form in the Idea. The matter of nature alone is ugliness without an intellect, an organizing principle, or a superimposed Idea relating the order of nature, to the human intellect. Using the metaphor of architecture to apply the principles of nature to art, as constructed from natural material, Plotinus asks, 'How can the architect adjust the externally apparent house to the internal *eidōs* of the house and insist that it is beautiful? Only for this reason, that the external house, if the stones are imagined away, *is* the internal *eidōs*, divided of course with regard to the mass of matter, but indivisible in essence, even though appearing in multiple form'<sup>14</sup>. The work of art is the Idea, the intellection of the internal principles of nature. Structures belonging to appearances are imitations of the Idea, as in architecture, rather than form, as form is divisible in matter but indivisible in the Idea. The Idea, that which is beyond sensory images in the ordering of the universe, is continually present but inaccessible, as it is concealed in the architecture of Borromini, in mathematical and geometrical structures underlying the formal arrangements.

For Plotinus the ordering principles of the Universal Intellect are shared by the Human Intellect in the creative *Nous*, an actualized form of the absolute, defined as an abstract ordering principle in the Mind and a controlling and organizing principle of matter, thus a model of reality expressed in concrete philosophical, spatial and architectural terms. The *Nous* of the human intellect is capable of formulating the Idea within itself, while for Plato the Idea only existed outside the human intellect. Through *Nous*, the incorporeal and intangible thoughts of the Idea are disseminated into the spatial realm of form and matter. In that the ordering principles are shared by the human and universal intellect, the idea of beauty is inaccessible to both sensory appearance and the organizing principle itself: 'The Nature, then, which creates things so lovely must be itself of a far earlier beauty; we, undisciplined in discernment of the inward, knowing nothing of it, run after the outer, never understanding that it is the inner which stirs us; we are in the case of one who sees his own reflection but not realizing whence it comes goes in pursuit of it...'<sup>15</sup>.

The idea of beauty lies beyond the apparent structure of reality, and is given as an archetype, as in *Nous*. The archetype of the beauty found in material forms exists in the Nature Principle. The archetype is given by light and primal beauty and is the creative source of the first Reason Principle. The question, then, is how the Intellectual Principle is represented in an image or appearance, and the answer is by non-representation, by division and dissemination. The Idea gives shape or form to matter, and thus beauty, through *Nous*. In the section on Beauty, the Sixth Tractate of the *Enneads*, Ideal Form is defined as unity and harmony instilled into shape.

Thomas Aquinas, who lectured in Rome from 1265 to 1267, and began the *Summa Theologica* at Santa Sabina on the Aventine, formulated, in the tradition of Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus, a conception of the Idea, correlating idea with form, beginning with

the separation of form and matter, and the idea of form as principle in the Universal Intellect. As he explains in *Summa Theologica*,

the Greek word *Idea* is in Latin *Forma*. Hence by ideas are understood the forms of things, existing apart from the things themselves. Now the form of anything, existing apart from the thing itself, can be for one of two ends; either to be the exemplar of that of which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge of that thing, according as the forms of knowable things are said to be in him who knows them<sup>16</sup>.

Form is given by the inner principle, the human intellect as microcosm of the Universal Intellect. Works of art are differentiated from works of nature in that the form of the man-made object preexists in the intellect, though in both nature and the man-made object, the likeness of the form exists in the actuating principle, the creative *Nous* or the inner principle, as in the structure of the house, from Plotinus and Aristotle, the preexistent Idea in the *Nous* of the architect. In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever. An agent of generation does not act for the sake of the form, but the likeness of the form is in the agent. In some agents the form of the thing preexists according to its natural being. In other agents the form of the thing preexists according to intelligible being. Thus the likeness of a house preexists in the mind of the architect.

For Marsilio Ficino and the Florentine Platonic Academy, the Idea entails conceptualization in the human intellect, and is no longer a metaphysical substance existing outside the world of sensory appearances or the human intellect. Art is the primary manifestation of the Idea, despite the Platonic restrictions of form as appearance and imitation. Using the example of the architect, Ficino conceives of the process of abstraction in artistic production. He explains in *Sopra lo amore*,

From the beginning the Architect conceives in his spirit the reason and approximately the Idea of the edifice; he then makes the house (according to his ability) in the way in which he has decided in his mind. Who will deny that the house is a body, and that it is very similar to the incorporeal Idea of the artisan, in whose image it has been made? It must certainly be judged for a certain incorporeal order rather than for its matter<sup>17</sup>.

The reconstruction of the image of the house or body in the imagination is given by the inner ordering principle of the sensory images. The order or form is incorporeal, in abstracted matter, as opposed to the matter. The order, emanating from the Universal Intellect, is preserved between the corporeal and incorporeal, and the order or form can exist without body or matter, as it is prior to it. Along with the abstraction of form and inner sensory images comes the Neoplatonic emphasis on interior illumination in the processes of imitation, as in the ordering of the rational principles of nature in Alberti's *concinnitas* and the establishment of canons of beauty or *Bellezza*. Unlike Plotinus, form is a product of the human intellect while matter is a product of the exterior world, and *res cogitans*, or things thought, are separate in their generation from *res extensa*, or things external, though connected by the inner ordering principle.

*Bellezza*, or sensible beauty, and the realization of the *Bello*, the idea of the beautiful, in artistic representation, are manifestations of the metaphysical existence of form as well in Neoplatonic thought, given a priori in the ordering principle of the intellectual vision of form, as opposed to matter, and as opposed to generation and synthesis in the phenomenological congregation of matter. In the metaphysic of the *Bello*, aesthetic value, representative of moral value, is transferred in the ordering principle, creating interior illumination and the capacity to transfer the *Bello* to works of art. *Bello* is extracted from *convinto*, or conviction, but *convinto* is not associated with the generation of forms by Ficino, although it is by Gian Paolo Lomazzo in the *Trattato dell'arte della pittura*, published in 1584<sup>18</sup>. Lomazzo combines the metaphysical idea of the *Bello* with the process of the artistic conception in Aristotelian terms; the metaphysic of interior illumination is combined with the interaction of matter and form in universal cognition and the making of things.

### ***Disegno Interno at the Accademia di San Luca***

*Disegno interno* exists a priori of artistic execution and is combined with Christian theology by Zuccari in being the manifestation of the Universal Intellect, or a *scintilla della divinita*. The Idea is implanted by God in angels without sensory perception, and then it is transferred to human intelligence, as the aspect of Universal Intelligence in human intelligence. Works of art are meant to be thought as works of nature in resemblance and correspondence, in embodying the same internal principles, as in Leon Battista Alberti's *concinnitas*. Following Plotinus, the forms produced or replicated from an incorruptible substance are varied, infinite, fragmented, corrupted and disseminated, as in Borromini's architecture, in comparison to the pure and unified forms of the absolute, as in the lantern of San Carlo, in the pure light from the oculus and the resolution of architectural forms. Baroque forms contrast the intertwined and variegated corporeal forms of the terrestrial realm in Neoplatonic hierarchies to the pure forms of the absolute, representing a passage through the tortured labyrinth of reality. For Zuccari, forms of design can only be the result of accident:

But in forming this internal Design man is very different from God: God has one single Design, most perfect in substance, containing all things, which is not different from Him, because all that which is in God is God; man, however, forms within himself various designs corresponding to the different things he conceives. Therefore his design is an accident, and moreover it has a lower origin, namely in the senses<sup>19</sup>.

Human designs are formed by a process which Zuccari compares to a spark, as in the *scintilla della divinita*, the spark being the first concept created from the intellective virtue, or Idea, the first manifestation, in Aristotelian terms, of the Idea in the sensory imagination, being, as in an accident, indeterminate and confused. The spark is the transformation of the Idea, as matter and form, into cognition, retaining both matter and form, following Aristotle.

The light from the spark is interior illumination, which lights the senses and the intellect, and is disseminated in variegated material, as in San Carlo, and sculptural ensem-

bles such as Bernini's *Ecstasy of St. Theresa*. Order is manifest in material form, being transferred through the ordering principle of the Idea. In *L'Idea de' Pittori, Scultori e Architetti*:

As to form fire the stick strikes the stone, from the stone sparks escape, the sparks light the tinder, then the wick is carried from the tinder to light the lamp; so the intellective virtue strikes the stone of concepts in the human mind, and the first concept, a spark ascending the tinder from the imagination, and moves phantasms, and ideal imaginations—this first concept is indeterminate and confused, born in the faculty of the soul, or the agent of the intellect possible and understood<sup>20</sup>.

*Disegno interno* is a sign of the possibility but imperfection of human knowledge. Nature achieves order through an intellective principle, formulated through the projection of human logic and reason onto the mute forms of nature. Art imitates nature in so far as it enacts human reason, of which the forms of nature are representative:

And if we wish to know why Nature can be imitated, it is because Nature is guided toward its own goal and toward its own procedures by an intellective principle. Therefore her work is the work of unerring intelligence, as the philosophers say; for she reaches her goal by orderly and infallible means. And since art, chiefly with the aid of the above-mentioned design, observes precisely the same in its procedure, therefore Nature can be imitated by art, and art is able to imitate Nature<sup>21</sup>.

Because the forms of nature are combinations of form and matter, art is capable of forming itself from the Idea or intellect. Through the agent of the mind of the artist, artistic forms arise as natural forms, forms being transformed into matter, accidental and discernible, revealing in the indeterminateness and confusion of sensory experience the clear order of the intellective principle. The multiple and variable forms of the material world emanate from the unity of the absolute as the multiple forms of Baroque architecture in the worship space of the church emanate from the unified and resolved source of light in the lantern. Multiplicity and variability are the result of the limitations of the human intellect. Following Aristotle, *disegno interno* is a process of actualization, and intellect is an operating instrument. *Disegno* involves the phantasm, formed concept and object of sensation, a mental representation of a real object, a product of the imagination, a manifestation and reflection of form according to the intellective principle. 'Design is form, concept, idea, and light of the intellect, and in its potential of intention and understanding, its first intellections...are not without phantasms; phantasms, say the philosophers, are sensible things, ideally formed concepts'<sup>22</sup>. *Disegno* also entails dreams, which serve to form, in the internal sense of the imagination, prototypes for representations of form in images, through cognition and judgment. 'Imagination is formed by common sense in cognition, judgment, and the division of types, composed together as we experiment in dreams, having seen [objects of perception] represented in dreams'<sup>23</sup>.

For Zuccari, 'whenever our intellect forms within itself some Universal Design, at the same time the two internal senses [cognition and imagination] form together their

own particular design'<sup>24</sup>. The *disegno esterno* of sensory experience is the particular correlation to the universal *disegno interno* of abstraction and intellection in the Idea, the particularity in matter as defined temporally of universal form. The formation of particulars in *disegno esterno*, and the identification of physical types, as in dreams, is a scientific process: 'Our intellect has in this way begun to intend something, and from that [process] science is acquired, and after being placed in it some type is acquired, and science itself, also forms in itself various representative designs of this particular first known through the senses'<sup>25</sup>. Zuccari explains that the intellect first knows the nature of material things given by the internal principle, then it knows the types in which the nature is reflected, then it knows the singular forms caused by the types. The forms are known by the two internal concepts, sensed and unsensed, particular and universal, formed from imagination and cognition<sup>26</sup>, and become a particular design representing the singulars of the particular nature.

Design is the means by which the Idea in the intellect becomes the external form of the artistic production. Design is 'both intellective and practical, corresponding to two intellects in us, the speculative one for universal purposes, and the practical one for the purposes of our operations'<sup>27</sup>, as described in the transcripts of Romano Alberti. Both types of design are necessary, 'as one is objective and has known limits in practical and particular things and the other represents things which are universally understood in the intellect. Thus there is an intellective design and a practical design'<sup>28</sup>. Design as a whole is the 'expression and declaration of a concept, which is first in the mind'<sup>29</sup>. *Disegno interno* fabricates the Idea, while *disegno esterno* fabricates the exterior visual experience. *Disegno esterno* is 'defined in visual form. It is the form of all exemplary forms of all things which we can imagine and form'<sup>30</sup>.

External design 'is a form of science, a faculty for determining the proportions of quantity in visible things'<sup>31</sup>, a faculty assigned by Marsilio Ficino to the mechanism of vision in *Theologia Platonica*. But external design is also 'a definition of our intelligence, reflecting the intellect in a clear mirror, making visible the things represented in the intellect, through intelligible forms, reasoned in metaphor and similitude'<sup>32</sup>. Artistic forms come about through the process of design in the use of literary tropes from Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, including metaphor and similitude. Meaning in the visual arts is given by language, as visual forms are the manifestation of ideas.

<sup>1</sup> Federico Zuccari, *L'Idea de' Pittori, Scultori e Architetti*, Torino, 1607, in Detlef Heikamp, ed., *Scritti d'Arte di Federico Zuccaro* (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore, 1941), p. 95.

<sup>2</sup> Translated in Erwin Panofsky, *Idea, A Concept in Art Theory* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968), p. 85.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 86.

<sup>4</sup> Zuccari, *L'Idea*, p. 95: 'Il disegno considerato particolarmente, in quanto che è parte, è fondamento della Pittura, Scultura e Architettura e imitatione d'un idolo che consiste nelle proporzioni di quantita continua, perfettamente disposte, e determinate, formato dall' istess' Artefice. Questo Disegno nell'istesso modo considerato, si puo deserivere per metafora, che sia luce dell'intelletto, e vita dell'operationi, o vero realmente che sia faculta di determinare perfettamente le proporzioni di quantita, nelle cose visibili. Considerando il Disegno universalmente, in quanto che alla fabricatione d'ogni Idea intellettuale, si può quel nome applicare...cioè che sia lume generali dell'intelletto; Primo motore dell'intelligentie; forma de tutte le forme; Alimento delle pratiche; un'altro Nume, o Natura generante, che aviva, opera, e da spirito a tutte l'intelligentie humane'.

<sup>5</sup> Trans. in Panofsky, *Idea, A Concept in Art Theory*, p. 11.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>7</sup> Translated in Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Louise Loomis, ed. (New York: Walter Black, 1943), p. 29.

<sup>8</sup> Trans. in Panofsky, *Idea*, p. 27.

<sup>9</sup> Trans. in Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, p. 35.

<sup>10</sup> Zuccari, *L'Idea de' Pittori, Scultori e Architetti*, p. 37: 'Il Disegno è forma formata, e imaginata nell'anima, e nell'intelletto, e pero vuole che l'anima nostra, e l'intelletto sia nel sudetto modo quasi un'istessa cosa e come mano che piglia la forma delle forme, cioè il Disegno formato dall'istessa specie, e cosi apprende, intende, e conosce....'

<sup>11</sup> Trans. in Panofsky, *Idea*, p. 17.

<sup>12</sup> Trans. in Plotinus, *The Six Enneads* (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), p. 239.

<sup>13</sup> Trans. in Panofsky, *Idea*, p. 26.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28.

<sup>15</sup> Trans. in Plotinus, *The Six Enneads*, p. 240.

<sup>16</sup> Trans. in Anton Pegis, ed., *The Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Random House, 1945), p. 162.

<sup>17</sup> Marsilio Ficino, *Sopra lo amore o ver convito di Platone* (Florence, 1544), Or. V, Ch. 3–6, pp. 94ff in *Opera latina*, II, 1336ff (trans. in Panofsky, *Idea*, p. 137).

<sup>18</sup> See Edmondo Cione, 'Presentazione del Traduttore', in Panofsky, *Idea*, p. xv.

<sup>19</sup> Zuccari, *L'Idea*, I, 7, p. 50, trans. in Panofsky, *Idea*, p. 88.

<sup>20</sup> Zuccari, *L'Idea*, p. 25: 'Pero dico, che si come per formare il fuoco il focile batte la pietra, dalle Pietra n'escon faville, le faville accendon l'esca; poi appressandosi all'esca i sosarelli s'accende la lucerna; Così la virtu intelletiva batte la pietra de i concetti nella mente humana; e il primo concetto, che svavilla accende l'esca dell'imaginatione, e move i fantasmi, e imaginationi ideali, il qual primo concetto è indeterminato, e confuso, ne dalla facolta dell'anima, o intelletto agente possibile e inteso'.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 21: ‘La ragione poi, perche l’arte imiti la Natura è; perche il Disegno interno artificiale, e l’arte istessa si muovono ad operare nella spedutione delle cose artificiali al modo, che opera a Natura istessa. E se vogliamo anco sapere perche la Natura sia imitabile, e perche la Natura è ordinata da un principio intelletivo al suo proprio fine, e alle sue operationi; onde l’opera sua è opera dell’intelligenza non errante, come dicono i Filosofi’.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 37: ‘Dunque il Disegno è forma, è concetto, è Idea, è luce all’intelletto, e alle potenze sue all’intendere, e al capire, e le prime intellectioni non sono fantasmati, ma non sono senza fantasmati; perioche i fantasmati, come il Filosofo vuole, sono cose sensibil, concetti formati Ideali’.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 26: ‘Il secondo senso interno si chiama fantasia, è formate dal senso commune nella cognitione, giuditio, e coparatione di quelle specie, riceve in se stesso, e in oltre queste insieme compone, come noi sperimentiamo ne i sogni, ch’ havendo veduto’.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 31: ‘che mai l’intelletto nostro forma entro di se qualche Disegno universale, se anco prima, o insieme questi due sensi interni non formano i proprii Disegni particolari’.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 32: ‘L’intelletto nostro ha in questo modo cominciato ad intendere qualche cosa, e di lei acquistata la scienza, o pure doppo posto in esso qualche specie acquistare, e la scienza istessa, forma anco in se stesso varii Disegni rappresentanti quel particolare conosciuto per il senso’.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.: ‘In prima egli dirittamente conosce solo la natura commune delle cose, e poi indirittamente, e quasi riflettendosi sopra di se medesimo, considerando, e la specie, con la quale primo conobbe, e l’operatione con la quale conobbe, conosce anco il singolare dal quale detta specie in qualche modo fu cagionata; Così non potendo lui in alcun modo, o compitamente, o incopitamente intendere senza Disegno, forma anche di quel singolare un Disegno interno in se stesso. Si che intendono noi qual si voglia cosa; prima la fantasia, e la cognitione dei singolari di quella formano due concetti, uno sensato; e l’altro insensato, poi l’intelletto dirittamente intendono, forma il Disegno interno commune rappresentante quella cosa in generale, quanto alla natura comune, in ultimo indirittamente discorrendo, ne forma un’altro Disegno particolare rappresentando i singolari di quella natura’.

<sup>27</sup> Romano Alberti, *Origine e Progresso dell’Academia del Disegno* (Pavia: Pietro Bartoli, 1604), p. 19: ‘Si deve pero sapere che non d’una, ma di due forti, è il disegno, cioè intellettivo, e pratico, poiche si come sono duoi intelletti in noi uno chiamato speculativo, il cui fine proprio è l’intendere solamente in universale, e l’altro adimandato intelletto pratico, il cui termine proprio, e ultimo è l’operare, o per dire meglio esser principio dell’operationi nostre...’.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.: ‘è necessario che anco siano due i disegni alluminanti gl’intelletti nostri, cioè uno che è oggetto, e termino dell’intelletto cognoscitivo, e questo rappresenta all’intelletto le cose universalmente intese, e l’altro che è oggetto e termino dell’intelletto pratico, e questo rappresenta all’intelletto le cose in particolare, e in singolare’.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 18: ‘Il disegno è una apparente espressione e dichiarazione del cocetto, che era prima nell’animo...’.

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 19: ‘che cosa sia il disegno esterno, in forma sua visiva...hora il pratico dico essere forma di tutte le forme esemplare di tutte le cose, ch’immaginare, e formare si possono...’.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, p. 18 ‘la forma della scienza...che dice il disegno essere una facultà di terminare perfettamente le proportioni di quantità nelle cose visibile...’.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.: ‘è insieme un termine della nostra intelligenza, in cui come in lucidissimo specchio l’intelletto chiaramente, e espressamente vede le cose rapresentate in lui, per le forme intelligibili ornanti l’istesso intelletto, o ragionando in metafora, e similitudine lo difiniremo...’.